But, it is said, why not adopt milder measures? Why, after the king
had consented to so many reforms, and renounced so many oppressive
prerogatives, did the Parliament continue to rise in their demands at
the risk of provoking a civil war? The ship-money had been given up.
The Star Chamber had been abolished. Provision had been made for the
frequent convocation and secure deliberation of Parliaments. Why not
pursue an end confessedly good by peaceable and regular means? We recur
again to the analogy of the Revolution. Why was James driven from the
throne? Why was he not retained upon conditions? He too had offered to
call a free Parliament, and to submit to its decision all the matters
in dispute. Yet we are in the habit of praising our forefathers, who
preferred a revolution, a disputed succession, a dynasty of strangers,
twenty years of foreign and intestine war, a standing army, and a
national debt, to the rule, however restricted, of a tried and proved
tyrant. The Long Parliament acted on the same principle, and is
entitled to the same praise. They could not trust the king. He had no
doubt passed salutary laws; but what assurance was there that he would
not break them? He had renounced oppressive prerogatives; but where was
the security that he would not resume them? The nation had to deal with
a man whom no tie could bind, a man who made and broke promises with
equal facility, a man whose honour had been a hundred times pawned, and
never redeemed.
Here, indeed, the Long Parliament stands on still stronger ground than
the Convention of 1688. No action of James can be compared to the
conduct of Charles with respect to the Petition of Right. The Lords and
Commons present him with a bill in which the constitutional limits of
his power are marked out. He hesitates; he evades; at last he bargains
to give his assent for five subsidies. The bill receives his solemn
assent; the subsidies are voted; but no sooner is the tyrant relieved,
than he returns at once to all the arbitrary measures which he had
bound himself to abandon, and violates all the clauses of the very Act
which he had been paid to pass.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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