“It demands effort when one wishes to grasp one object rather than another, to abstract himself from the thousand things moving through his mind, from his other interests, and even from his own person; and repressing the tendency to hasty judgment, to give himself up wholly to the object” (3: p. 139). From the emphasis laid on the receptivity, on strict obedience to prescription, follows the emphasis upon order, regularity, and punctuality, as the first requisites in instruction. “There can be nothing worse than the evil of procrastination, of the putting off or shirking of work, so that it is not pursued in all earnestness and in an unchangeable order. What is undertaken to be done at a set time should be accomplished as surely as the sun rises” (3: p. 138). With such an emphasis on receptivity one can easily imagine how Hegel would regard the function of memory in learning. Although he thought it the most difficult point in psychology “to state exactly the place and significance of memory and its organic connection with thought,” it was conceived as somehow opposed to subjectivity and reflection. “Consciously or unconsciously it is ever in use.... It is busy filling the soul with pure existences of outer space” (3: p. 135); “it is mechanization of intelligence.” Thus better memory in youth than in old age had, for Hegel, a certain teleological significance, and great minds have generally good memories. However, even for Hegel, receptive learning is not the ultimate end, but is only propedeutic. “It is most important to lead the boy from the state of mere receptivity to that of personal effort. For learning, which is mere taking in and remembering, is a very small part of education” (3: p. 144). Again: “If learning were to be limited to a mere taking in, its results would be little better than writing upon the water, for it is not mere receiving, but the self-activity of grasping, and the power to put in use, that alone make knowledge our possession” (3: p. 141). As to the comparative importance of various branches of study, Hegel, as a champion of the New Humanism, opposed “the effort of making mathematical exercises the chief subject of education” (as the followers of Kant and Pestalozzi tried to do), considering it as “putting the mind upon a rack in order to evolve a perfect machine,” as “making the mind empty and dull” (3: pp. 154-155). Against mere realistic study of natural science he exalted the value of the classics, considering the classical worlds as the second paradise of the human race, “the paradise of the spiritual man, who in his beautiful spontaneity, freedom, depth, and joyousness stepped forth as a bridegroom from his chamber”; praising their masterpieces as “the spiritual bath, the profane baptism, which gives the soul its earliest and most lasting taste for things of beauty and of knowledge” (3: p. 157).