Kant’s view on care and discipline, in its general character and details, very much reminds us of that of Locke. Kant is peculiarly empirical here in his procedure, and his protest against playing with and flattering the child, against indiscriminate punishment, his plea for the freedom of children’s bodily activities, for early inculcation of self-restraint and obedience, for gaining the child’s confidence and respect, his opinion in regard to manners, and children’s crying, his advocation of the hardening process, all seem to be the repetitions of Locke in a modified language. In regard to habit formation, the two writers seem to differ from each other, for Kant repeatedly opposes the formation or fostering of any habits in children. He says: “The more habits a man allows himself to form, the less free and independent he becomes; ... for whatever he has been accustomed to early in life always retains a certain attraction for him in after-life” (2: p. 45). But if we read his lines a little more carefully we find this opposition more apparent than real. One emphasizes the establishing of good habits while the other lays stress on the prevention of the formation of harmful habits. Whether Kant ever read Locke’s “Thoughts on Education,” and was thus influenced by him or not, I am unable to ascertain. This great similarity may come from their common experience in tutorship. Or we might attribute it largely to the influence he received from Rousseau and Basedow, and not directly to that of Locke. Care and discipline were in Kant’s view essentially negative functions. The positive side of education he calls culture. It includes the physical, mental, and moral training. It is the building up or the unfolding of naturally endowed faculties of man by their exercise. Instruction is sometimes necessary, but it is only as an aid to the self-activity of the child. Children should be provided with ample opportunities for such exercise.