[9] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 184. Renouvier confesses that in most of this treatment of the problem of ethics he follows Kant[10] and although his admiration for Kant’s work is not concealed, nevertheless he is not altogether satisfied with it, and does not refrain from criticism. Indeed this reconstruction of the Critical Philosophy in a revised version is the main effort of the neo-critical philosopher, and it is constantly manifest. [10] On p. 108 (vol. I) he refers to “_le philosophie que je suis, et que j’aimerais de pouvoir suivre toujours_.” He complains that Kant did not adhere rigorously to his own principles, but vainly strove to give an objectivity to the laws of the practical reason by connecting them to metaphysics. But, he says, “on the other hand I maintain that the errors of Kant can be corrected in accordance with the actual principles of his own philosophy. I continue my serious attachment to this great reformer in spite of the very serious modifications I am endeavouring to make in his work.”[11] [11] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. no. 110. In the opinion of Renouvier, Kant’s work, the _Metaphysic of Morals_, is marred by its neglect of history in its relation to ethics, by a disfigured picture of right which does not make it any more applicable to existing human conditions, also by the rather artificial and complicated nature of its doctrines. He further reproaches Kant for excessive rigorism and formalism, accompanied by a vagueness which prevents the application of much of his teaching. This, it seems to us, is a reproach which can be hurled easily at most of the ethical teachers whom the world has seen. The incessant vagueness of paradoxical elements in the utterances of such teachers has inevitably compelled their disciples to find refuge in insisting upon a “right spirit” of action, being devoid of any clear teaching as to what might constitute right action in any particular case.