The rudiments of morality, according to Renouvier, are found in the general notion of “obligation,” the sense of ought (_devoir-faire_) which the human consciousness cannot escape. Any end of action is conceived as a good for the agent himself; and because of liberty of choice between actions or ends, or between both, certain of these are deemed morally preferable. There are certain obligations which are purely personal, elementary virtues demanded from any rational being. It is his interest to preserve his body by abstaining from excesses; it is his interest also to conserve and develop the faculties of his nature. This is the point upon which Guyau makes such insistence in common with Nietzsche—the development, expansion and intensification of life. There are, Renouvier points out, duties towards oneself, involving constant watchfulness and intelligence, so that the agent may be truly self-possessed under all circumstances, maintaining an empire over himself and not falling a constant victim to passion. “Greater is he that ruleth himself than he that taketh a city,” are not vain words. This is the rudimentary but essential virtue which Renouvier calls “virtue militant”—moral courage. Intellectually it issues in Prudence or Wisdom; on the side of sense and passion it is represented by Temperance. These duties are present to conscience, which itself arises from a doubling of consciousness. “We have the empirical person with his experience of the past, and we have the ideal person—that is to say, that which we wish to be,”[12] our ideal character. In so far as we are conscientious we endeavour to bring “what we are” into line with “what we conceive we should be.” The moral agent thus has duties towards himself, obligations apart from any relation to or with others of his kind. [12] _Science de la Morale_, vol. I, p. 25.