Doubters were told to look at the rising sciences of psychology and sociology, which, as Auguste Comte had himself prophesied, were approaching gradually to the “type” venerated—namely, an exact and mathematical character. Biology, it was urged, was merely a special branch of physico-chemistry. As for beliefs in freedom, in art, morality and religion, these, like philosophy (metaphysics) itself, belonged to the earlier stages (the theological and metaphysical) of Comte’s list, stages rapidly to be replaced by the third and final “positive” era. Such, briefly stated, were the affirmations so confidently put forward on behalf of science by its devoted worshippers. Confidence in science was a marked feature of the work written by Renan in the years 1848-1849, _L’Avenir de la Science_. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, Renan himself played a large part in undermining this confidence. Yet the time of his writing this work is undoubtedly the period when the confidence in science was most marked. By this it is not implied that an even greater confidence in science has not been professed since by many thinkers. That is probably true, but the important point is that at this time the confidence in science was less resisted than ever in its history. It seemed to have a clear field and positivism seemed to be getting unto itself a mighty victory. The cult of facts, which is so marked a characteristic of the scientific or positivist temper, penetrated, it is interesting to note, into the realm of literature, where it assumed the form of “realism.” In his Intelligence we find Taine remarking, “_de tout petits fails bien choisis, importants, significatifs, amplement circonstanciés et minutieusement notés, voilà aujourd’hui la matière de toute science_.”[1] It was also, in the opinion of several writers, the _matière de toute littérature_. The passion for minute details shows itself in the realism of Flaubert and Zola, in the psychology of Stendthal* and the novels of the Goncourts. It was no accident that their works were so loved by Taine. A similar spirit of “positivism” or “realism” animated both them and him. [1] Preface to _Intelligence_. With the turn of the half century, however, a change manifested itself by the fact that the positivist current began to turn against itself, and our period is, in some respects, what Fouillée has called _la réaction centre la science positive_.[2] The function of philosophy is essentially criticism, and although at that period the vitality of philosophy was low, it nevertheless found enough energy to criticise the demands and credentials of Science. [2] Compare also Aliotta’s book, _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_, Eng. trans., 19l4.