To cope with this formidable rival, which, whether right or wrong in principle, must, under England’s policy, be surpassed, the ships of the _Admiral_ class were designed. In these the main battery is mounted in two barbettes built high out of water, near the extremities of the vessel, while in a central broadside are carried the armor-piercing and rapid-fire guns. The engines, boilers, and barbette communications are protected by a water-line belt of thick armor which covers about forty-five per cent. of the ship’s length; at the upper edge of this there is a protective deck, and at its ends athwartships bulkheads are erected; before and abaft the belt and beneath the water-line there is a protective deck, together with the usual minute subdivision into water-tight compartments. The barbettes and the cylindrical ammunition tubes which extend from the belt-deck to the barbette floors are strongly armored. Owing to the strong protest made against these vessels, more efficient armor protection has been given to the battle-ships lately laid down. * * * * * From this very hasty and incomplete review it may be gathered that the first and most lasting influence in the development of battle-ships is due to France and England, though the _Monitor_ had no little share in the result. It is difficult to say, in the ceaseless struggle for something which, if not good, is new, what may be the outcome of the latest efforts to revolutionize the question, or, curiously enough, to bring it back to the point whence its departure was taken. Whatever may be the courage of one’s opinion, there is not sufficient data—a first-class war can only supply these—upon which to say, Yea, yea! or Nay, nay! and prophecy is certain to be without honor, especially as the discussions given in the appendices demonstrate how the wisest and most experienced have no substantial agreement in views. An editorial in a late number of the _Broad Arrow_ declares that “the days of armored plate protection are, in the opinion of many thinking men, coming to a close. The gun is victorious all along the line, and the increased speed given to the torpedo-boat, taken in conjunction with the destructive efficiency attained by the torpedo, makes it a questionable policy to spend such large sums of money as heretofore upon individual ships.” There is no room here to give the various arguments, though very clever and ingenious they are, by which this position is fortified; it may be added, however, that to a large degree this is the opinion of Admiral Aube, the late French Minister of Marine, and undoubtedly this declaration re-echoes the shibboleth of those other French officers who, in the absolute formula of their chief, Gabriel Charmes, insist that “a squadron attacked at night by torpedo-boats is a squadron lost.”