Modern thinkers and present problems : $b an approach to modern philosophy through its historySinger, Edgar A. (Edgar Arthur)
Philosophy
Modern thinkers and present problems : $b an approach to modern philosophy through its history
Singer, Edgar A. (Edgar Arthur)
Philosophers; Philosophy -- History
Let us begin by making clear just what _is_ the ideal which guides
the scientist in his expectations respecting the world he studies.
Perhaps no one accomplishment of science has been more inspiring than
the picture of certain large aspects of nature that Newton succeeded
in drawing,--such aspects, namely, as are presented in the behavior
of suns, and planets, and moons. All these huge masses are governed
by a single law, called the law of gravitation. Now to say that they
are governed by this law means no more than this, that if we knew
the mass, the position, and the velocity of each of these heavenly
bodies at a given moment, we should be able by means of the law
to predict their masses, positions, and velocities for all future
moments. This result is, to be sure, only an approximation, for we
know that gravitation is not the only force which bodies exert on each
other. We have never succeeded, _e.g._, in reducing the attractions
and repulsions of electrified bodies to gravitation, nor do we any
longer try to do this. But Newton’s degree of success provides us with
an ideal to which we seem ever more and more closely to approach.
Instead of considering such huge bodies as suns and planets and their
satellites, we divide these up into extremely minute parts, which we
may call for the moment _atoms_. We struggle then to conceive a law
as completely determining the behavior of these atoms, as the law of
gravitation determines that of planets. So that, if we knew a limited
number of characteristics of each of these atoms at a given moment,
our law would enable us to predict their future and to reconstruct
their past history. As we approach more and more closely to this ideal,
less and less in the behavior of these small parts of nature is left
to guess-work. In so far as we hope this ideal may be continuously
approached, we hope that in its atomic parts nature is entirely devoid
of freedom. And if we hope this, we must inevitably hope, too, that
what we have called an atom is neither a moral nor an immoral being.
This hope is usually called _the mechanical ideal_, and nature in the
light of it is viewed as a mechanism. It has guided science to victory
after victory, and I venture to think that no result of philosophical
experience is more firmly established than this, that whatever theory
we may in the end accept respecting human nature, its freedom, its
moral responsibilities, no assumption of that theory may stand in
contradiction with the mechanical ideal. To have recognized this truth
and to have had the courage to maintain it at all costs, was the
heroic service rendered by Spinoza at a moment in human history when
such service was badly needed. It is also the reason why Spinozism, in
spite of its apparently gloomy outlook upon the world, has made such a
forcible and lasting appeal to the imagination of thinking men. In what
follows it is against certain false implications that have been thought
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