1. The chief question in the Psychology of Ethics is whether the Moral Faculty, or Conscience, be a simple or a complex fact of the mind. Practically, it would seem of little importance in what way the moral faculty originated, except with a view to teach us how it may be best strengthened when it happens to be weak. Still, a very great importance has been attached to the view, that it is simple and innate; the supposition being that a higher authority thereby belongs to it. If it arises from mere education, it depends on the teacher for the time being; if it exists prior to all education, it seems to be the voice of universal nature or of God. 2. In favour of the simple and intuitive character of Moral Sentiment, it is argued:-- First, That our judgments of right and wrong are immediate and instantaneous. On almost all occasions, we are ready at once to pronounce an action right or wrong. We do not need to deliberate or enquire, or to canvass reasons and considerations for and against, in order to declare a murder, a theft, or a lie to be wrong. We are fully armed with the power of deciding all such questions; we do not hesitate, like a person that has to consult a variety of different faculties or interests. Just as we pronounce at once whether the day is light or dark, hot or cold; whether a weight is light or heavy;--we are able to say whether an action is morally right or the opposite. 3. Secondly, It is a faculty or power belonging to all mankind. This was expressed by Cicero, in a famous passage, often quoted with approbation, by the supporters of innate moral distinctions. 'There is one true and original law conformable to reason and to nature, diffused over all, invariable, eternal, which calls to duty and deters from injustice, &c.' 4. Thirdly, Moral Sentiment is said to be radically different in its nature from any other fact or phenomenon of the mind. The peculiar state of discriminating right and wrong, involving approbation and disapprobation, is considered to be entirely unlike any other mental element; and, if so, we are precluded from resolving or analyzing it into simpler modes of feeling, willing, or thinking. We have many feelings that urge us to act and abstain from acting; but the prompting of conscience has something peculiar to itself, which has been expressed by the terms rightness, authority, supremacy. Other motives,--hunger, curiosity, benevolence, and so on,--have might, this has right. So, the Intellect has many occasions for putting forth its aptitudes of discriminating, identifying, remembering; but the operation of discerning right and wrong is supposed to be a unique employment of those functions. 5. In reply to these arguments, and in support of the view that the Moral Faculty is complex and derived, the following considerations are urged:-- First, The Immediateness of a judgment, is no proof of its being innate; long practice or familiarity has the same effect.