Moral Science; a Compendium of EthicsBain, Alexander
Philosophy
Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics
Bain, Alexander
Ethics; Ethics -- History
The pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed, it is important
to take notice of their Causes, both immediate and remote, by whose
means they can be secured or avoided. We contract a habit of passing
rapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause; and, as in the
typical case of money, these causes are apt to rank higher in
importance, to take a greater hold on the mind, than the sensations
themselves. The mind is not much interested in attending to the
sensation; that can provide for itself. The mind is deeply interested
in attending to the cause.
The author next (XIX.) considers the Ideas of the pleasurable
sensations, and of the causes of them. The Idea of a pain is not the
same as the pain; it is a complex state, containing, no doubt, an
element of pain; and the name for it is Aversion. So the name for an
idea of pleasure is Desire. Now, these states extend to the causes of
pains and pleasures, though in other respects indifferent; we have an
aversion for a certain drug, but there is in this a transition highly
illustrative of the force of the associating principle; our real
aversion being to a bitter sensation, and not to the visible appearance
of the drug.
Alluding (XX.) to the important difference between past and future time
in our ideas of pleasure and pain, he defines Hope and Fear as the
contemplation of a pleasurable or of a painful sensation, as future,
but not certain.
When the immediate causes of pleasurable and painful sensations are
viewed as past or future, we have a new series of states. In the past,
they are called Love and Hatred, or Aversion; in the future, the idea
of a pleasure, as certain in its arrival, is Joy--as probable, Hope;
the idea of future pain (certain) is not marked otherwise than by the
names Hatred, Aversion, Horror; the idea of the pain as probable is
some form of dread.
The _remote_ causes of our pleasures and pains are more interesting
than the immediate causes. The reason is their wide command. Thus,
Wealth, Power, and Dignity are causes cf a great range of pleasures:
Poverty, Impotence, and Contemptibility, of a wide range of pains. For
one thing, the first are the means of procuring the services of our
fellow-creatures; this fact is of the highest consequence in morals, as
showing how deeply our happiness is entwined with the actions of other
beings. The author illustrates at length the influence of these remote
and comprehensive agencies; and as it is an influence entirely the
result of association, it attests the magnitude of that power of the
mind.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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