Moral Science; a Compendium of EthicsBain, Alexander
Philosophy
Moral Science; a Compendium of Ethics
Bain, Alexander
Ethics; Ethics -- History
But our fellow-creatures are the subjects of affections, not merely as
the instrumentality set in motion by Wealth, Power, and Dignity, but in
their proper personality. This leads the author to the consideration of
the pleasurable affections of Friendship, Kindness, Family, Country,
Party, Mankind. He resolves them all into associations with our
primitive pleasures. Thus, to take the example of Kindness, which will
show how he deals with the disinterested affection;--The idea of a man
enjoying a train of pleasures, or happiness, is felt by everybody to be
a pleasurable idea; this can arise from nothing but the association of
our own pleasures with the idea of his pleasures. The pleasurable
association composed of the ideas of a man and of his pleasures, and
the painful association composed of the idea of a man and of his pains,
are both Affections included under one name Kindness; although in the
second case it has the more specific name Compassion.
Under the other heads, the author's elucidation is fuller, but his
principle is the same.
He next goes on (XXII.) to MOTIVES. When the idea of a Pleasure is
associated with an action of our own as the cause, that peculiar state
of mind is generated, called a motive. The idea of the pleasure,
without the idea of an action for gaining it, does not amount to a
motive. Every pleasure may become a motive, but every motive does not
end in action, because there may be counter-motives; and the strength
attained by motives depends greatly on education. The facility of being
acted on by motives of a particular kind is a DISPOSITION. We have, in
connexion with all our leading pleasures and pains, names indicating
their motive efficacy. Gluttony is both motive and disposition; so Lust
and Drunkenness; with the added sense of reprobation in all the three.
Friendship is a name for Affection, Motive, and Disposition.
In Chapter XXIII., the author makes the application of his principles
to Ethics. The actions emanating from ourselves, combined with those
emanating from our fellow-creatures, exceed all other Causes of our
Pleasures and Pains. Consequently such actions are objects of intense
affections or regards.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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