(b) The moral good of virtue which is intended in acts must not be regarded as the supreme good, but should be referred to God, since He alone is the Last End (see 20). Hence, to eat and drink with moderation solely because that is reasonable and suitable to human nature, if one excludes the Last End, is to slight the necessary purpose and is morally bad. (c) The intention of moral good or virtue in human acts need not be actual or reflex. Thus, a person who has a previously formed intention of living reasonably, or who at the time of eating intends to eat moderately for the sake of health, sufficiently intends a moral end. Likewise, it is not necessary that the reference of an act to the Last End be made actually or explicitly. Hence, every person in the friendship of God, in all his deliberate acts that are not evil, has a sufficient reference of them to God contained in the fact that he has chosen God for his Last End, or in that here and now he intends some motive that becomes a rational being. 86. An actual and explicit intention of the moral goodness of an act, and an actual and explicit reference of the act to the Last End, though not necessary, increase the moral value of what is done. 87. Axiom of Pseudo-Dionysius: “That act is good whose causes are complete; that act is evil in which a single cause is lacking.” (a) This axiom can be understood as referring to perfect good, and the meaning then is that an act is not perfectly good in the moral sense unless all its elements--its object, purpose and circumstances--are good; just as an oration is not called perfect, unless all its elements--the speaker, the matter, the style and the delivery--are what they should be. Hence, a single defect is enough to make an act fall short of perfection. (b) The axiom can be understood of essential goodness, and the meaning then is that an act is not essentially good unless all the causes that contribute to essential goodness--the object of the act and any circumstances that may through the intention of the agent take on the character of object--are good; just as a man is not said to be healthy, unless his heart, lungs, and all the other chief parts of the body are sound. Hence, an act is substantially bad, if either its own end (the object of the act) or the special purpose had in mind by the agent (the end of the agent) is bad, as explained above in 79-81.