113. The objects of condign merit--i.e., the rewards promised by God for the good works done for Him in this life--are: (a) an increase of sanctifying grace; (b) the right to eternal life; (c) the attainment of eternal life, if the one who merits dies in grace; (d) an increase of glory. 114. The conditions for the merit of strict congruity are the same as those given above (112), except the promise made by God, which is not required. Examples of this kind of merit are the sanctity of the Blessed Virgin, which made her deserve more than others to be the Mother of God, and the conversion of St. Paul through the merits of St. Stephen. 115. For the merit of wide congruity it is necessary that the work done be morally good. Examples of this kind of merit are the sighs of the ancient Patriarchs, as obtaining the coming of the Messiah. The just man can merit with the merit of wide congruity the following: (a) his own conversion after a future fall; (b) his final perseverance; (c) temporal goods. Art. 5: THE PASSIONS (_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 22-48.) 116. Having discussed the acts proper to man, we shall now speak of the passions, which are common to both man and beast. 117. Definition.--The passions--also called the emotions, affections, or sentiments--are acts of desire; but, unlike the acts of the will, they are directed, not to good apprehended by the higher knowing power of the intellect, but to good apprehended by the lower knowing power of sense and imagination. They are defined as: acts or movements of the sensitive appetite which arise from the representation of some good in the sense faculties, and which produce some transformation in the body, such as palpitation of the heart, increased circulation of the blood, paleness, blushing, etc. 118. Division.--There are two classes of passions; (a) the concupiscible, which have as their object sensible good considered as delightful, or sensible evil considered as unpleasant, and which are love and hatred, desire and flight, delight and sadness; (b) the irascible, which have as their object sensible good or sensible evil considered as difficult to attain or to avoid, and which are hope and despair, boldness and fear, anger. 119. The concupiscible passions are defined as follows: (a) love, the first of the passions and the cause of all the others, tends to sensible good considered as desirable, abstracting from its presence or absence; while hatred is the aversion from sensible evil considered precisely as unsuitable and abstracting from its presence or absence; (b) desire tends to sensible good that is absent, and flight turns away from sensible evil apprehended as future; (c) delight is the affection produced in the sensitive appetite by the presence and possession of the object desired; (d) sadness is the passion which dejects the soul on account of the presence of an evil.