For the Stoics, too, Morality is action in accordance with the law of
Nature, but Spinoza goes further than the Stoics, in that he does away
with any universally applicable standard of moral conduct, and sets up
instead of Nature pure and simple, which is the same for all, each man's
individual nature as the authority which shall lay down rules of
behaviour for him. So Morality is something individual and subjective.
Man acts according to the requirements of his interest; his own nature
shows him what his interest requires; no other person has any right or
any qualification to form a judgment upon the worth of his conduct, to
call it good or bad, for he cannot know what course of action the man's
personal nature, peculiar to himself and to no other, may prescribe to
him. This is the doctrine of anarchy and amorality put in a nutshell, a
more wordy paraphrase of the _Fais ce que vouldras_ (please yourself),
the terse inscription that Rabelais put over the entrance to his Abbey
of Thélème, as the only law governing that abode of alluring wantonness.
Spinoza certainly does half-heartedly concede to Reason the rôle which
Aristotle positively assigns to it ("To act in an absolutely virtuous
manner is merely to act according to the guidance of Reason," etc.), but
it is impossible to see how Reason can exercise guidance and control if
"everyone does according to the supreme law of Nature that which
results from the necessities of his nature." This can surely only mean
that everyone may yield to the unbridled desires of his natural
instincts, which is the very reverse of self-control by Reason. If
Nature is to rule despotically, there is obviously no place for a
constitutional limitation of her sole power by the effective counsel and
protests of Reason.
But Spinoza renounces in a much more definite way his views recognizing
the right of every individual "to form his judgment as to what is good
and bad according to the supreme law of Nature," for he calmly adds:
"Society can be founded, if it reserves to itself the right possessed by
the individual to take revenge, and to pronounce a verdict on what is
good and what is bad; thereby it acquires the power to prescribe rules
of conduct for the community, to make laws, and to enforce them, not by
means of Reason, which cannot restrict passions, but by threats....
Hence in a state of Nature, sin cannot even be imagined."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account