Morals of Economic InternationalismHobson, J. A. (John Atkinson)
Philosophy
Morals of Economic Internationalism
Hobson, J. A. (John Atkinson)
International cooperation; Reconstruction (1914-1939)
The standard of international morality, particularly in matters of
commercial intercourse, is on a still lower level. If, indeed, one were
to press the theoretic issue, whether a state or a nation is a morally
independent being, or whether it is in some sense or degree a member of
what may be called an incipient society of states or nations, nearly
every one would sustain the latter view. We should be reminded that
there was such a thing as international law, however imperfect its
sanctions might be, and that treaties, alliances, and other agreements
between nations implied the recognition of some moral obligation. How
weak this interstate morality is appears not merely from the fact that
under strong temptation governments repudiate their most express and
solemn agreements--to that temptation individuals sometimes yield in
their dealings with one another--but also from the nature of the
defence which they make of such repudiation. The plea of state
necessity, which Germany made for the violation of the neutrality of
Belgium, and which was stretched to cover the brutal mishandling of the
Belgian people, is unfortunately but an extreme instance of conduct to
which every state has had recourse at times, and--still more
significant--which every state defends by adducing the same maxim,
"_salus reipublicae suprema lex_".
Here is the sharpest distinction between individual and national
morality. There are certain deeds which a good and honorable man would
not do even to save his life; there are no deeds, which it is admitted
that a statesman, acting on behalf of his country, may not do to save
that country. It is foolish to try to shirk this disconcerting
admission. The Machiavellian doctrine of "reason of state" is, in the
last resort, the accepted standard of national conduct. This does not
signify that a nation and its government admit no obligation to fulfil
their promises, or even voluntarily to perform good offices for other
nations, but that there is always implied the reservation that the
necessity, or, shall we say, the vital interests, of the nation
override, cancel, and nullify all such obligations. And when
"necessity" is stretched to cover any vital interest or urgent need, it
is easy to recognize on what a slippery slope such international
morality reposes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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