In the same year, a big step towards the proper utilisation of motor transport for military work was taken by an extensive experiment made in this direction during the British Army manoeuvres. The use of mechanical transport was subsequently referred to by the King as one of the special features on that occasion, and the opinion was very generally expressed that the rather sudden and early termination of the manoeuvres was due to the unexpected effect of motor transport in increasing the mobility of the troops, and bringing the opposing forces into contact with one another with startling rapidity. Even so late as 1912, a certain number of military authorities were still very doubtful as to the advisability of relying on the motor vehicle in active service, but the manoeuvres in question undoubtedly proved the case, although the difficulties of operating mechanical transport for the first time on an extensive scale were increased by the fact that the machines available were of all sorts of makes and types, no attempts at standardisation having been possible. Many of the machines hired for the occasion were in very poor condition, and did not compare favourably with those owned by the Government. Consequently, the difficulties of working in convoy at short intervals were accentuated. All the motor transport was concentrated on one side, and the armies dependent upon it were kept well supplied daily with fresh meat, the opposing forces being dependent on horsed transport and chilled meat. Motor buses were on one or two occasions during the manoeuvres utilised with great success for the rapid movement of fairly large bodies of men. These manoeuvres probably represented the last appearance of traction engines for any military use other than the haulage of very heavy guns, or other kinds of quite abnormal work, not forming any part of the regular system of supply and transport.