India -- Economic conditions -- 1918-1947; India -- Politics and government -- 1919-1947; India -- Social conditions
1. That there was no provocation on the part of the people of Amritsar
for the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre either on the day of the shooting
or immediately before it. He had the situation well in hand and the
atmosphere was quite calm and peaceful.
2. That his order prohibiting the meeting was issued the morning before
the meeting and reached only a fraction of the people in Amritsar on
that festival day of the thirteenth.
3. That when he arrived on the scene of the meeting with his squad, he
found the people listening to the speaker in a calm manner and there
was no show of resistance offered to him. On the other hand, on seeing
him enter the premises, the audience began to run off in all directions.
4. That he opened fire at the assembled meeting without giving the
people any warning or chance to disperse, and he continued firing while
his ammunition lasted--all the time directing his shots at places where
the crowd was the thickest.
5. That he had brought a machine gun with him, which he had to leave
outside because the lane was too narrow for it to enter. And he
admitted that the casualties would have been much greater if he had
been able to use the machine gun.
6. That his reason for the massacre at the Jallianwalla was to teach
the people a lesson, and he did not stop shooting after the crowd had
begun to disperse because he was afraid they would laugh at him. The
general wanted to show the people the might of the British rule.
7. That he did not think to or care to provide succor to the wounded at
Jallianwalla. It was not a part of his business.
Reproduced below is a part of General Dyer’s testimony before Lord
Hunter’s committee:
“Q. When you got into the Bagh what did you do? A. I opened fire.
Q. At once? A. Immediately. I had thought about the matter and don’t
imagine it took me more than thirty seconds to make up my mind as to
what my duty was.
Q. How many people were in the crowd? A. I then estimated them roughly
at 5,000. I heard afterwards there were many more.
Q. On the assumption that there was that risk of people being in the
crowd who were not aware of the proclamation, did it not occur to you
that it was a proper measure to ask the crowd to disperse before you
took that step of actually firing? A. No, at the time I did not. I
merely felt that my orders had not been obeyed, that martial law was
flouted, and that it was my duty to immediately disperse by rifle fire.
Q. When you left Rambagh [his headquarters] did it occur to you that
you might have to fire? A. Yes, I had considered the nature of the duty
that I might have to face.
Q. Did the crowd at once start to disperse as soon as you fired? A.
Immediately.
Q. Did you continue firing? A. Yes.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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