The increasing severity of the whole campaign called for a more intensive and energetic exploitation of our food resources; the slow, deliberate supply methods of the civil authorities, which had sufficed for the first phase of the campaign, were no longer adequate. Twice, at Kissaki and on the Rufiji I had been put in a most difficult position with regard to supplies, which had almost made it impossible to carry on the operations. A more efficient supply service which would know the military needs, look ahead and work more quickly and energetically was a vital necessity for the further carrying on of the campaign. Fortunately I was able to convince the Governor on this point, and, as a result, a new supply detachment was raised from the force, and sent ahead to Massassi, via Livale. They established several subsidiary detachments, which were attached to the administrative stations in the Lindi area, and in this way worked side by side with the civil authorities in organizing, and, later, in carrying out, the cultivation and storing of food. In this way the desired impregnation of the supplies and transport service with the necessary military spirit was completely attained. At this time there was no appreciable shortage of kit, and there was also an adequate supply of arms and ammunition. With a view to the envelopment of the enemy at Mkalinzo, where he was reported to be in strong force, Captain Otto had marched his detachment south from Kungulio. North of Mawa he covered the fertile area of Madaba, and the line of transport and telephone communication running from Lake Utungi, via Mawa to Madaba. On 24th January, 1917, Captain Otto was attacked north of Mawa by several battalions of the Nigerian brigade. The enemy was beaten off with heavy losses and pursued several miles through the bush to an entrenched position, where he took refuge. The troops under Captain Schulz, who had been left behind after our departure from Kibeta, were gradually withdrawn to Ungwara. They had been reinforced and relieved from time to time after the fighting in the region of the Kibeta-Utete-Kissi mountains. Strong enemy forces—identified as an infantry brigade—had followed them. In spite of his numerical superiority, the single engagements were very costly, and for the most part unfavourable for the enemy. Captains von Lieberman, Goering and Koehl, and numerous patrol leaders on many occasions completely routed more than twice their number of Indian or negro troops, and captured rifles, machine guns and ammunition. The long war had produced a large number of capable leaders, and their example, as in the case of Lieutenant Kroeger, who was afterwards killed, roused unbounded enterprise and daring. Over and over again, and without stopping to ask the strength of the opposing force, this officer, followed by a handful of men with fixed bayonets and cheering loudly, had charged the enemy in the thick of the bush. He had even trained the Askari.