Alexander wisely restricted the new levies to provinces which were not yet the seat of war. He also decided that a proportion of 2 per cent. generally, and 1 per cent. in Siberia, would be sufficient. Men were not lacking, but arms and equipment were deficient, so also were officers capable of organising and training the new recruits. The collection of the levies was an operation requiring much time and trouble: it was even more difficult to realise the money contribution, part of which was not finally received until the following year. But considering the vast extent and poverty of the empire the immediate results were exceedingly creditable. We shall soon have occasion to note the rapid strengthening of the Russian army. With all this enthusiasm and patriotic endeavour there was not unnaturally mingled a good deal of distrust and discontent among the nobles, who voiced such public opinion as existed. These feelings were justified to a great extent by the foolishness of the Government, which reported non-existent military successes, and misrepresented the operations which were in progress. A certain amount of reliable news, however, filtered through from the front. It gradually became clear that, despite the so-called successes of the Russians, the armies were steadily retreating, and that cities and provinces were being abandoned to the invader. The general results of all this was a more or less openly expressed desire that the conduct of the war should be changed. To a certain extent it was the outcome of genuine conviction that the command might be in better hands, but it was also largely the reflection of the insubordinate discontent among the army officers, which had reached its height at Smolensk. The outcry was chiefly against Barclay, whose foreign name was made the platform for every kind of unjust accusation. It appears to have chiefly been the sentiments of Bagration and his adherents which made themselves heard in the capital. Barclay had few friends--Löwenstern says that Konovnitzin was almost the only general officer attached to him--and had neither leisure nor talents for defending his reputation against intriguers. Alexander apparently always trusted and liked him; but on the abandonment of the offensive early in August the clamour became so loud that he was constrained to give way, though he angrily declared that he would not assume responsibility for any evil consequences. He appointed a committee consisting of Arakcheiev, the Vice-Chancellor Count Kotschubey, and Prince Lopukhin, to consider the question of a different conduct of the war. The action was probably merely nominal, for both the remedy and the man to apply it had been practically agreed upon. The committee met on the 17th of August. It recommended the appointment of a commander-in-chief of all the Russian field armies, and for the post submitted to the Tzar the name of General Prince Golénischev-Kutuzov.