Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
History
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812
Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Military leadership; Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia
There were practically only two candidates for the onerous position.
One was Kutuzov. The other was Bennigsen, who in his own estimation
was fully equal to the responsibility. Others, however, did not think
so highly of his merits, or of those of his campaign of 1807 against
Napoleon. Alexander knew him as one of his father’s assassins, and
probably distrusted his vain and selfish character. Besides, he was a
foreigner. Kutuzov’s military reputation was estimated as highly as
Bennigsen’s; his laurels were recent; and, above all, he was a native
Russian, popular with the army and believed to be the exponent of the
hard-fighting tactics of far-famed Suvórov.
On the 18th Alexander nominated Kutuzov to the position of
commander-in-chief. Bennigsen was appointed chief-of-staff. The reasons
are somewhat obscure. Clausewitz considers that Bennigsen procured
his appointment in the hopes of succeeding to Kutuzov’s place if, as
seemed not unlikely, the old man’s health should break down. Bennigsen
himself says that, at Vilna, Barclay informed him that Alexander wished
to employ him again. It is possible that Alexander appointed him in
view of such a contingency as Clausewitz suggests; certainly he was
senior to all the generals with the army, so that, in the event of
Kutuzov’s retirement, he would naturally assume the command. He seems
to have regarded himself rather as his chief’s colleague than his
assistant. Kutuzov did not take his appointment very kindly, and the
yoking together of the two veterans, one a Russian noble and the other
a German soldier of fortune, was not a happy expedient.
While at Smolensk, Napoleon regulated his main line of communications,
which was now to run by Vilna, Minsk, Borisov and Orsha, to Smolensk.
Smolensk became the advanced depôt of the army, and Vitebsk being of
only secondary importance, Charpentier was transferred to the former
place with the greater part of his garrison. Winzingerode, however,
was so active in the neighbourhood of Vitebsk that on the 21st
Napoleon detached Pino’s Italian division thither to support Pajol.
The alarm was a false one, for Winzingerode had, as we know, only a
weak detachment of cavalry. On receiving intelligence of the retreat of
the Russian main army he fell back towards Moscow, and Napoleon called
Pino, Pajol and Guyon towards him, but only the cavalry were able to
rejoin in time for the battle of Borodino.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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