Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
History
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812
Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Military leadership; Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia
At and near Tarutino and around Moscow, under Field-Marshal Prince
Golénischev-Kutuzov, were 105,000 regulars and 20,000 irregulars. Under
Wittgenstein, near Polotsk, were 40,000 regulars, irregulars, and
militia. Marching to reinforce Wittgenstein was Count Steingell with
10,000 men, almost all regulars. At Riga, under Essen I, there were
perhaps 15,000 troops.
Admiral Chichagov had under his general command about 70,000 men in
all, including General Lüder’s division coming from Serbia. Ertel at
Mozyr now had about 14,000, while Bobruisk was garrisoned by 6000.
Finally, in small regular detachments, drafts of recruits and militia,
and Cossacks, there were perhaps 30,000 men on the march to reinforce
the various armies. The Russian total therefore was nearly 310,000 men.
CHAPTER X
THE FIRST STAGES OF THE RETREAT
The battle of Vinkovo put an abrupt end to any hopes which Napoleon may
yet have cherished as to a speedy conclusion of peace. It is fairly
obvious, however, that he had already made up his mind that Moscow
must be abandoned. On October 14th orders were reiterated to evacuate
the hospitals at Mozhaïsk and elsewhere by the 20th. Junot was also
directed to destroy arms which could not be carried away. Evers’ column
of reinforcement, which had already passed Viasma, was turned back to
that town; and other _régiments de marche_ were ordered to remain at,
or return to, Smolensk.
The condition of the army needs careful consideration. Montholon,
who may be regarded as speaking for his master, says that it was
strengthened and revivified by its long rest, that it had twenty days’
supply of food, that it was abundantly provided with ammunition.
It is to be observed that this categorical _apologia_ does not mention
the vitally important matters of discipline, clothing, and horses. Of
these something will presently be said. The points noted by Montholon
may be discussed one by one.
In the first place a distinction must be drawn between the troops in
and about Moscow and those belonging to Murat’s advance-guard.
Of the former, it may be said that they were, as regards the men, in
fair physical condition. Even here, however, a distinction must be
made. The Guards and the 1st Corps had been lying inactive for four
weeks. They had had the benefit of the best that Moscow could afford;
and certainly should have been in first-rate condition. But, on the
other hand, they had been living freely, upon food not always as
nourishing as attractive to rough men, and upon the wines and spirits
which abounded in the palaces and warehouses, and were probably hardly
prepared for new and terrible hardships. The 3rd and 4th Corps had been
generally encamped outside Moscow, had obtained little by pillage, and
had been uselessly fatigued and over-worked by constant foraging and
outpost work. Yet it is possible that these unpampered men were really
better prepared for what lay before them than the Guards and Davout’s
corps.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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