Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
History
Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812
Foord, Edward (Edward A.)
Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821 -- Military leadership; Napoleonic Wars, 1800-1815 -- Campaigns -- Russia
As to the question of food supplies it is difficult to express an
opinion. It is certain that food was not lacking, and probably the
troops might have carried with them twenty days’ rations had discipline
been good and transport abundant. As it is, it is clear that the army
was short of supplies within ten days of its departure from Moscow.
There is no reason to doubt Napoleon’s statement that the supply of
ammunition was abundant.
Napoleon having, according to his custom, dealt entirely with material
matters, it may be well to follow in his footsteps before considering
things moral. The evidence of survivors is all to the effect that the
troops were badly and inadequately clothed. Except in so far as some of
them were supplied from the pillage of Moscow the men had only the worn
and tattered uniforms which had served them all through the advance.
The footgear was much worn, and the underclothing in a deplorable
condition. Bourgogne, a sergeant in the Young Guard--one of a favoured
corps, therefore--speaks of wearing a shirt until it rotted upon him.
Only on the 17th of October were leather and linen issued, and it was
then too late to make up the material.
[Illustration:
THE CHURCH OF VASILII BLAGORENNYI AT MOSCOW
Built by the famous Tzar Ivan the Terrible in the latter half of the
16th century]
Whatever might be the state of the army’s supplies it lacked transport
for them. The horses were dying steadily from fatigue, sickness and,
above all, lack of food. The state of the cavalry has been noticed,
and the artillery and trains were naturally in equally bad condition.
Napoleon refused to abandon any of his vast and wretchedly horsed
artillery in order to lighten the dead weight which encumbered the
march. It would have been wiser to leave behind a part of the enormous
mass of ammunition and to fill up the artillery waggons with food
or forage. The commander of the artillery of the Young Guard did do
something of the kind, with good results, but for the most part the
dread of Napoleon effectually hindered such common-sense action. The
draft horses, in bad condition, and overloaded in any case, without
considering non-military and unnecessary further additions, began to
die at the very beginning of the retreat, and the artillery and trains
were lost piecemeal. Much of what food and forage the army took with it
was lost early, owing to the failure of the transport.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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