One fact is curious and inexplicable. It might have been thought that the most strenuous exertions would have been put forth to provide the individual soldiers with plenty of breadstuffs, when the deficiency of the transport was well known. There is evidence that food was left in Moscow. De Fezensac states that he made a present of the flour which he could not carry away to some Muscovites whom he had fed during his stay in the city. The incident does honour to his humanity. Yet one wonders why he did not distribute it among his soldiers, who were ere long dying of want. It is clear that little food was carried by the soldiers themselves, and the reason for this is probably connected with the low _morale_ of the army. A long course of excess of every kind had weakened such sense of honour as the bulk of the men possessed, and the scattered barracking necessitated by the destruction of the greater part of the city rendered the maintenance of order very difficult. So far as can be judged, constant drill was by no means a feature of the Napoleonic army, and inspections of kits were apparently often perfunctory. It is, at any rate, certain that they were so during the sojourn in Moscow. Haversacks and knapsacks, instead of being stored with necessaries, too often contained plunder. The officers either made no determined attempt to check the evil, or their efforts were without avail. It is probable that the former discreditable condition of affairs actually obtained. Brigandage was rife in the Napoleonic armies, and numbers of officers had their private vehicles laden with plunder. Generals were often no better. Napoleon himself added to the encumbrances of the army two convoys of spoils, one of gold and silver bullion, the presence of which may be justified, the other of objects of purely sentimental value, for which excuse can hardly be made. It was but another example of the paltry spirit which impelled Napoleon to desecrate the tomb of Frederick the Great. It is difficult to blame subordinate officers when their ruler and their generals set so evil an example, still less is it possible to find fault with the ignorant soldiery. Be this as it may, lack of discipline, fostered by a low sense of honour among the officers, and greed of plunder, was not the least of the causes of the destruction of the _Grande Armée_. Finally, the pernicious practice of permitting the troops to march in disorder was soon to be productive of fatal consequences. Officers and men had grown so accustomed to it that its extent was probably not at first realised, and it soon became impossible to check it. The results were terrible. The worse element among the suffering troops had every opportunity for disbanding, and the Russian irregulars, who could achieve little against closed bodies of infantry, were able to commit immense havoc.