Generally speaking, Napoleon’s commanding officers had one great defect. With few exceptions they had become so habituated to submission to the dominating personality of the Emperor that they had lost all power of initiative. In an army so huge and of such experience there were naturally many officers who in a less warlike age would have been acclaimed as great generals. The majority of the divisional and brigade leaders were excellent, though some were already wearing out. Several of them--men such as Verdier--had had considerable experience in independent command, and some had acquired therein a by no means savoury reputation. Gudin, the leader of Davout’s 3rd Division, was perhaps the most distinguished as a soldier, but his colleagues Friant, Morand, Desaix and Compans were all fine officers. Legrand, Merle, Verdier, Ledru, Marchand, Broussier, Pino, Bruyère, Sebastiani, St. Germain, Claparède, Tharreau, and others were men of considerable merit and experience. Of the General Staff it may be said that it had scarcely any affinity with the board of specially trained officers which accompanies and assists a modern commander-in-chief. Napoleon’s absorption, in his single person, of all military and administrative functions had reduced it to a position of complete insignificance. For all practical purposes it was nothing but a mass of orderlies, and though it contained many talented and meritorious officers they had small opportunity of distinguishing themselves so long as they remained members of it. Napoleon in one moment of exasperation declared that “the General Staff is organised in such a manner that nothing is foreseen.” The remark was more or less true; but that such a state of affairs could exist is a very severe comment upon his methods. The invading host was, in short, the army of a despot who endeavoured to supervise everything himself and discouraged initiative in others, with the natural result that much that might have been done to minimise the catastrophe was not attempted. The numbers of the invading army and its composition, according to the states and peoples who contributed contingents, are given in detail in Appendices A and B. Roughly it may be said that during the campaign Napoleon disposed of the following numbers:-- First Line Head-quarters; Imperial Guard; } 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, } Corps; } 449,000 Austrian Corps; Cavalry Reserve } Second Line 9th Corps; Polish and Lithuanian levies; } 2 French Divisions; } 165,000 German Troops, Drafts, Parks, etc. } Third Line Drafts and organised troops in touch with } Russians at close of campaign, including } 60,000 garrisons of Danzig and on Vistula } -------- 674,000