Here was a deadlock. The arguments on both sides seemed conclusive. No practical solution of the difficulty was proposed at the time, nor has been since. Both parties were firm in their convictions. Neither could yield without the surrender of essential rights. A conflict was unavoidable unless one party would relinquish the authority claimed by the imperial government; unavoidable unless the colonies, essentially free by growth, development, and distance, would yield to pretensions incompatible with their rights as British subjects. The new policy contemplated after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 was carried into effect after the treaty of Paris in 1763. But nothing could have been more unfortunate than the time at which Great Britain inaugurated this policy, and no ministers than those by whom it was to be carried out. On essential political questions which divided the colonists and the mother country Great Britain herself was in the midst of a revolution. The new policy which was inaugurated fell into the hands of those opposed to it. Whig ministers were charged with the execution of an illiberal and reactionary scheme. Consequently, the administration of American affairs was weak and vacillating. The result was inevitable. Had Pitt, with his large views and great administrative abilities, been at the head of affairs for ten years after the peace, the Revolution might have been postponed. On the other hand, had the mercantile system during the same period been administered with the unity of purpose and thoroughness of measures which characterized Carleton's administration in Canada, and had it been enforced by the military genius of Clive, the rebellion might have been temporarily suppressed.