until finally we reach a group (not existing in experience) embracing
substances formed of _all_ the elements. That there is no such substance
in the present scope of human knowledge has, of course, no significance
for the structure of the scheme. What is significant is the fact that
the scheme really embraces and arranges all possible substances in such
a way that we cannot conceive of any case in which a newly discovered
substance cannot after examination immediately be classed with one of
the existing groups.
To cite an example from another science. Physics, it will be recalled,
may be considered to be the science of the different kinds of energy.
This science, accordingly, is divided first into the study of the
properties of each energy, and then into the study of the relations of
two energies, of three energies, of four energies, etc. Here, too, we
may say that in the end there can be no physical phenomenon which cannot
be placed in one of the groups so obtained.
Of course, neither in chemistry nor in physics does this mean that each
_new_ case will fall within the scheme obtained by the exhaustive
combination of elementary concepts (whether chemical elements or kinds
of energy) _known_ at the time. It is quite possible that a new thing
under investigation contains a _new_ elementary concept, so that on
account of it the scheme must be enlarged through the embodiment of
this new element. But simultaneously a corresponding number of new
groups appear in the scheme, and the investigator's attention is
directed to the fact that he still has a reasonable prospect, in
favorable circumstances, of discovering these new things also. Thus
combinatory schematization serves not only to bring the existing content
of science into such order that each single thing has its assigned
place, but the groups which have thereby been found to be vacant, to
which as yet nothing of experience corresponds, also point to the places
in which science can be completed by new discoveries.
From the above presentation it is apparent how from the two concepts
"thing" and "association" alone a great manifoldness of various and
regular forms can be developed. They are purely empirical relations, for
the fact that several things can be combined in the graded series
described above according to a fixed rule does not follow merely from
the two concepts, but must be _experienced_. But, on the other hand,
both concepts are so general that the experiences obtained in some cases
can be applied to all possible experiences and may serve the purpose of
classifying and making a general survey of them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account