In the present war conditions, however, largely cut off from other countries, (except some small trade with Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and the like,) all ordinary relations which would influence German credit and industry must be counted out. There is no comparison of her prices and money with those of other countries in a free market, or with even a limited transportation of exports and imports. All commercial measurements are suspended for the time. Trade and credit are holding their breath. How long can they do it? Germany may have food enough; but how long can the stoppage of industry go on? Moreover, attention must be called to one momentous thing. We are seeing today, under military law, the greatest experiment in socialism ever witnessed. All wealth, income, industry, capital, and labor are in the direct control and use of a military State. Food, everything, may be taken and distributed in common. I think never before in history have we had such a gigantic, full-fledged illustration of socialism in actual operation. In the meanwhile, even though food may be provided, the reduction of industry in general has cut incomes right and left. That is, fewer goods are produced and exchanged. But goods are the basis of all credit. The less the goods exchanged, the less the credit operations. Nevertheless, the extraordinary issues of banknotes, the increase of deposits, as a result of quintupling the loans, means that former commitments in goods and securities cannot be liquidated. That is, the enormous increase of bank liabilities, to a considerable and unknown percentage, is not supported by liquid assets. These assets are "canned." Will they keep sweet? There is no new business, no foreign trade, sufficient to take up old obligations and renew those which are unpayable. Lessened incomes mean lessened consumption and lessened demand for goods. Hence the credit system is based on an uncertain and insecure foundation, dependent wholly upon contingencies far in the future which may, or may not, take the non-liquid assets out of cold storage and give them their original value. Moreover, apart from definite destruction of wealth and capital in the war--which must be enormous, as represented by the national loans--the losses from not doing business in all main industries during the whole period of the war (except in making war supplies) must be very great. As it affects the income and expenditure of the working classes, it may be roughly measured by the great numbers of unemployed. If they are used on public works, their income is made up from taxes on the wealth of others. Luxuries will disappear, and not be produced or imported. Incomes expressed in goods, or material satisfactions, have been diminished--which is of no serious consequence, if they cover the minimum of actual subsistence. The prolongation of the war will, then, depend on the ability to provide the supplies for war.