was that in London it was looked upon as an interference with English interests that Bismarck, by his attitude during the Polish insurrection, had prevented the effectuation of a coalition directed against Russia. During the war of 1864 over Schleswig-Holstein the threats were renewed, and even then we began to hear the watchwords with which public opinion in England for a decade has been mobilized against us: A Germany organized on a military basis, and with a fleet at its command besides, indicates that the goal of that State's policy, even more than in the case of France, is world rule. At that time, too, however, France and Russia were regarded by English war makers as the country's real enemies, and this conviction, rather than ideal considerations of any kind whatsoever, accounts for the fact that in the years 1870 and 1871 English policy followed a neutral course. England wished to see France weakened, had not foreseen Germany's great success, and had reserved for future opportunities the settlement of accounts with Russia, its very annoying rival in Asia. In other respects, however, Bismarck was by no means satisfied with the way in which England pursued its policy of "neutrality." He had expected, at least, that the English would condemn the war, begun, as it was, in such a criminal manner, and not that they would carry on with France a flourishing trade in weapons. "It is a surprising fact, pregnant with warning," he wrote in May, 1874, "that Mr. Gladstone succeeded so easily in holding the country to an attitude directly opposed to the traditional hostility of the English masses toward France." He had all the more reason to expect a different attitude in view of the fact that, as was well known in England, it had been out of regard for England that Bismarck in December, 1870, had refused an offer of peace from Thiers, which rested on the condition that Belgium should be united to France under the rule of King Leopold. After the battle of Sedan Lord Odo Russell and Disraeli aroused the fears of the English people over the possibility of a German invasion; but Bismarck, nevertheless, was thinking of an English-German alliance, which, on account of the blood relationship of the two dynasties, was by no means impracticable, and which to Queen Victoria would have seemed a natural combination. Subsequently, in the years 1873 and 1874, Bismarck negotiated with Lord Odo Russell in Berlin regarding a German-English alliance, and through Münster he also took up the matter with Disraeli, who denied very emphatically that he had French sympathies. Nothing, he said, was more incorrect. The two peoples, he alleged further, who alone could proceed hand in hand, and who must become more and more cognizant of that fact, were Germany and England. The power of France, he added, was on the wane, a fact regarding which the demoralization of the empire, the decrease of population, and the course of recent events left no room for doubt.