Notwithstanding Disraeli's views, however, the alliance with England, as is well known, was never formed. The most serious obstacle was created by the fact that party government in England rendered binding obligations extraordinarily difficult. Then came all sorts of pinpricks, as, for instance, Derby's advocacy in the year 1875 of Gortchakoff's famous rescue campaign. But despite all Bismarck held fast to the idea of bringing about closer relations with England, and the formation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary confirmed him in that purpose. "We shall have to adjust our attitude more and more," he wrote to Schweinitz in March, 1880, "with the object of increasing the security of our relations with Austria and England." It was this political desire that prompted him to reject a Russian proposal to unite the four Eastern powers in a common protest against England's isolated procedure in connection with the occupation of Egypt. He wished to prevent England from being humiliated by a prearranged coalition. A letter from Bismarck to Salisbury (July 8, 1885) has been preserved, which is very characteristic of this friendly attitude of German policy. "As to politics," he writes, "I have not the slightest doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two dynasties, as well as between the two nations, will give sufficient security for settling every existing or arising question in a conciliatory way." With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on, too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty. But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers which would insure England's position of power for another generation, answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England. In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a political testament this sentence would in all probability be contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has