Mr. Frothingham maintains that the German fleet came out with the object, and no other, of engaging the British fleet, a force known to be greatly superior in number of ships and power of ordnance. He apparently, but not quite clearly, suggests that the Germans knew how the British fleet would be employed and how it would be disposed. It would be difficult to put any other construction on the words--"With the object of engaging a fleet usually so disposed and so employed, the Germans came out from their bases." Surely this is a pure assumption which can only be supported by other assumptions founded on improbability rather than on probability. There is another assumption which is more plausible and which is supported by evidence--indirect, it is true, but copious. The war had been going on for more than a year and a half, and yet the German High Sea Fleet, in spite of its name, had sedulously refrained from venturing on the high seas. This made it the object of perpetual taunts by the enemies of Germany. There was some not completely suppressed restlessness among the German people. It has been an almost invariable rule in war that the fleet which keeps on lying in port is eventually forced to put to sea by public opinion. The tone and wording of many official German statements justify the conclusion that the German fleet put to sea with the object, not of meeting the British fleet, but of returning to port with the assertion that the British fleet had kept out of the way and that the North Sea had been "swept" for it in vain. Contrary to the probable expectation, Sir David Beatty's force was met with and there seemed a chance of being able to attack him with the whole strength of the German Navy. Unforeseen opportunities of the kind have frequently occurred in naval war, and may be expected frequently to occur again. FRENCH EXPERT'S OPINION Here may be quoted some observations, dated March 11, 1918, by the very distinguished French flag officer Vice Admiral E. F. Fournier, in a preface to a translation of an account of the general work of the British Navy: Je m'associe également aux regrets de l'auteur de cette notice qu'une ombre injustifiée ait été portée sur le tableau, si flatteur pour l'amour-propre de la Grande Bretagne, par certains critiques de la presse anglaise sur la bataille du Jutland. Je le fais d'autant plus volontiers que, dès la nouvelle de cette memorable rencontre navale, j'écrivis dans le Matin un article ou je vantais l'esprit de décision et la résolution si opportune de l'Amiral Beatty, n'hésitant pas à se jeter, malgré l'infériorité de ses forces, à la tête de la flotte allemande toute entière pour la contrecarrer dans ses desseins, en s'y accrochant énergiquement jusqu'a l'arrivée du renfort anglais, comme l'eût fait, sans aucun doute, Nelson lui-même, en pareil cas. TRANSLATION: