I regret as much as does the author of this article that an unjustified shadow has been cast upon the picture, so flattering for the self-esteem of Great Britain, by certain English press criticisms upon the battle of Jutland. I indorse his view the more willingly because, on first receiving the news of that memorable naval combat, I wrote for the Matin an article in which I extolled Admiral Beatty's spirit of decision and very opportune resolution, in not hesitating to throw himself, despite the inferiority of his forces, at the head of the whole German fleet to checkmate its designs, and in hanging on firmly until the arrival of English reinforcements, as Nelson himself undoubtedly would have done in such a case. Mr. Frothingham holds that the German fleet had not been led into a trap. Here, perhaps, something turns on the meaning given to particular words. A trap may be reasonably defined as an unforeseen and unfavorable position. Was it a deliberately sought or an unforeseen result that at 9 P. M. the German fleet was so placed that it had between it and its bases a hostile fleet which, as Mr. Frothingham tells us, still had an "overwhelming superiority in ships and guns?" Was such a position favorable or unfavorable? Surely there can be but one answer to each of these questions. LOSS OF BRITISH SHIPS Those who prefer to do so may use long words like "psychology" and "mentality," but the plain English of the situation is that the public mind in the allied and neutral countries was greatly impressed by the news that the British fleet had lost several ships, and by the fact that these losses were announced in the earlier part of the official communiqué concerning the battle. In the few great sea fights of which anything was generally remembered, the British had not lost ships. This, however, was far from being the universal rule. In the great naval actions of the seventeenth century we lost many ships. It was recognized that a fleet might be victorious and still lose ships. The great Lord Hawke at Quiberon Bay lost ships. The contending fleets of the present day are so very large that they recall those of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, when ships were lost in action by both sides. This, especially in view of the power of the naval ordnance of today, is almost certain to occur again. There is a wide difference between the naval gun of the present day and that of Nelson's and earlier times. The primary object of the older gun was to cause casualties among the enemy's crews; the modern naval gun is meant to destroy his ships. A fifteen-inch gun is not necessary to kill or wound a man. Naval weapons would be complete failures if, in sea fights, they were to prove incapable of destroying ships, and there is no probability that the destruction will fall on one side only.