The third month of the great German offensive may be considered the complement of the second; it has been an attempt to accomplish south of the great Picardy salient what north of it had been tried and had failed. In the second month the Lys salient had been developed, but the barrier ridges of Ypres and Arras still held. At the end of the third month the southern barriers--the Chemin-des-Dames and the watershed of the Oise-Aisne--had been carried by the enemy, but the terrain of occupation was so constricted, the enemy troops so distributed, that neither of his ambitious objectives had been brought nearer attainment. These objectives were the reaching of the sea by the Somme via Amiens, with its corollaries, the isolation of the allied armies north of that river and the occupation of the Channel ports; the decisive defeat of the French armies in the field, with whatever moral and political corollary that eventuality might produce; the occupation of Paris, and the demoralization of the French body politic. [See map on Page 19.] But the German failure of the third month is far more significant, has a far greater bearing on the war, than the failure of the second. The enemy has not only failed to broaden the Picardy front so as to permit a further advance down the Somme, to inflict vital losses on the Allies, to force the French back on the defenses of Paris, but, in attempting to do these things he has transformed all his potential resources into active resources, and these give evidence of approaching exhaustion. Only one conclusion is possible: Ludendorff with an initial preponderance of men and war material, with the tactical advantage of being able to manoeuvre from the centre outward, has been outgeneraled both in tactics and in strategy by Foch, so that the former's gains of terrain, while being of no advantage whatever--even a danger in certain sectors--have been purchased at an expenditure of men and material utterly incommensurate with their area and position. FORCING THE AISNE Ludendorff, on May 27, with a simultaneous diversion on the Lys salient and another at the southwest angle of the Picardy salient, northwest of Montdidier, began, with the most stupendous preparations ever concentrated, an attack on the southern barriers over a forty-mile front. He forced the Aisne the next day on an eighteen-mile front, and on May 31 he brought up at the Marne on a six-mile front, having made a penetration of thirty miles to the south. There he attempted to deploy both east and west, and was held. Meanwhile his baseline had been extended twenty miles to the west--to near Noyon. He had occupied about 650 square miles of new territory and had reduced his nearest approach to Paris from sixty-two to forty-four miles.