This was unnecessary, however, for here, north of Château-Thierry, the enemy was to meet a new foe--the American marines. It is doubtful whether the extraordinary performance of this corps and its French supports between June 6 and June 12, when they bent back the lower part of the bow between La Feste-Milon and Château-Thierry--from Grandeles, Champillon, and Clerembant Wood to Bussiares and Bouresches--can be included in the second battle of the Marne or serves as a diversion to the later battle of the Oise, directed against Compiègne. At any rate, the ardor of the marines had the desired effect, for on the very day they began their work the inspired Berlin Vossische Zeitung said: "The German Supreme Command cannot well proceed now against the newly consolidated French front, which is richly provided with reserves, and bear the great losses which experience shows are entailed by such operations." Thus ended the second battle of the Marne, sometimes called the Aisne-Marne battle. BATTLE OF THE OISE The flanking lines between which the Germans were directed to the Marne made the battle of the Oise inevitable as far as the Marne salient was concerned. For the salient, there was only this alternative, if its front could not be broadened: it must be "dug in" or be abandoned. But, being necessary, if it could be waged beyond a certain point, it would also become ambitious. It would supplement the Picardy front by continuing its line down to the Marne. Reaching the Oise at Montmacq, it would flank the French salient north of the Oise. Utilizing the Oise and Ourcq Valleys, it would envelop the defensive forests of Aigue, Compiègne, and Villers-Cotterets. This would mean Compiègne. From Compiègne the investment of Paris was possible. The battle, as far as the Germans are concerned, was probably their most disastrous effort of the war within the given time. Between thirty and thirty-four divisions were completely used up--a cost of over 400,000 effectives. Not only did their advance lack the element of surprise, but it entered a veritable trap. Their front was enfiladed with a destructive fire from impregnable flanks. The battle was also a revelation; it demonstrated as nothing else the waning man power of the enemy--the desperate mobilization of 16-year-old boys, of old men, of convicts, even.