In the first place, the location of the active front east of the Lago di Garda, from the Asiago Plateau to the sea, offers a certain indication of the German military situation in France. Its abortive character may also indicate the political situation in Austria-Hungary. With the lines in the mountains held, the operations on the Piave present no formidable danger to Italy. It was well known by the Italian General Staff that the Austro-German High Command intended to make the attempt to confirm the Italian disaster of Caporetto as soon as the melting of the snows permitted the transportation of men and supplies through the Alps. In the first place, the material and man power lost by the Italians in the retreat to the Piave, which included the actual elimination of the 2d Army, were replaced. In the second, it was absolutely necessary to rectify, even in the Winter, the northern mountain line east of the Lago di Garda. West of the lake up to the Tonale Pass, over the great glacier of the Adamello, it was practically invulnerable, save through the Giudicaria Valley. From west to east there were three doors, as it were, which had only been partly shut--the Vallarsa south of Rovereto, the path of the Frenzela Torrent and the angle it forms with the Brenta just above Valstagna, and the approach down the Piave in the region of Monte Monfenera from the Calcina Torrent. There were also other minor openings--the passes of Monte Asolone, between the Brenta and the Piave, covering the path south along the Val San Lorenzo, the Nos and Campo Mulo Valleys between Asiago and the Brenta. All these were closed in December and January, with a total loss to the enemy of over 10,000 men and 100 guns, save the domination of the Vallarsa, that was taken from the Austrians by the capture of Monte Corno on May 15. Meanwhile, the British and French armies had been transferred, the former from Il Montello on the Piave to the Asiago Plateau, and the latter from the Monfenera region to that of Monte Grappa. Between 200,000 and 300,000 Italian troops had been sent to the aid of France. Thus the Italian General Staff awaited the inevitable with confidence--a confidence fully seconded by people and press, for if the mass of the Italians had fought in ignorance before the catastrophe of Caporetto, since then they had learned the objects of the war--national as well as allied.