The prospects of the Romans were very gloomy, the enemy being in Italy with a superior force. And when they raised new legions, a great disadvantage now shewed itself; for the veterans were lost, and the Roman system of tactics was the very worst when the troops were not well trained, (hence the defeat at Cannæ,) as, on the other hand, it was the best with practised soldiers: they ought now to have formed in phalanx only, so as to keep their ground by means of masses. Hannibal had three roads before him, two of them through Tuscany, and one along the Adriatic to Rimini; there lay the army of Sempronius, reinforced by the fresh draughts which the new consul had brought with him. In Tuscany, the Romans must have expected no attack whatever, nor does any army seem to have been stationed there, unless perhaps an Etrurian levy at most; for Hannibal met with no resistance at all when he had resolved to go through the marshes. One of the roads was through the Apennines, by Prato to Florence; the other, from Bologna by Pietramala and Barberino, where the Apennines are broadest and wildest. The latter of these must at that time have been impassable, having perhaps been left to grow wild as a protection against the Gauls; it also passed too close by the Apennines,[23] and Flaminius might have arrived before its difficulties were overcome. He therefore chose the other road. With regard to this, much dispute has unaccountably arisen, and even the judicious and excellent Strabo is mistaken in thinking of the marshes near Parma: in Tuscany, no one now has a doubt about it. The road in question led by Lucca and Pisa. It is a very pleasant one now; but formerly the outlet of the Arno was a shallow gulf running up into the land as far as Sendi,[24] and this had been filled up from time immemorial, and had become a marsh like the Pontine, only it was not quite so unhealthy. Even now, on the northern side, one still sees a succession of lakes, six German miles long; the marshes drained by canals may everywhere be traced. This extends as far as Pisa, which lies somewhat higher, and is connected with the fruitful country of Lucca. Here, by Lucca where in spring all is a vast lake, we must presume the march of Hannibal to have been. He had learned that it was not a morass, but that it could be passed, although the whole way was under water: the Romans, however, did not expect any inroad from thence. Hannibal very likely went first to Modena, in order to deceive the Romans, and then turned off to the right. The difficulties of the march may have been somewhat exaggerated; but on the whole, there is a correct notion at bottom. Hannibal lost very many men and horses, and all his remaining elephants but one: he himself lost an eye. After three days and a half, he got out near Fiesole, and marched behind Florence into the upper valley of the Arno, which even as early as that time was drained; and he allowed his soldiers, among whom there were