Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
History
Niebuhr's lectures on Roman history, Vol. 2 (of 3)
Niebuhr, Barthold Georg
Rome -- History
Hannibal, however, started in autumn, and marched along the Adriatic
through the Abruzzi, the country of the Marrucinians and Pelignians.
Here Fabius withstood him, and tried to cut off his supplies, in which
he also partly succeeded. But Hannibal, when hard pressed, eluded his
vigilance, and quietly breaking up his camp, appeared all at once in
Campania. It was his design to make himself master of Casinum and
the Latin road, and by confining the communication between Rome and
Campania to the Appian road alone, to try and see whether the Italians
would declare for him. Here we may see an example of the disadvantage
of the want of maps, although on the whole it is wonderful how
well they managed in ancient times without them. Hannibal meant to
give the order to lead the army to Casinum; but the guide, either
misunderstanding him, or from downright dishonesty, led him through
Upper Samnium, along the banks of the Vulturnus, down to Casilinum; and
here Hannibal perceived that he was in quite a different neighbourhood
from where he had wished to be. In the meanwhile, Fabius had been
beforehand with him, and had left the Latin road, and strongly posted
himself in Samnium. Hannibal, after having visited the country of the
Falernians and Campania with devastation, and made an immense booty,
owing to which the men of rank at Rome were already sufferers, now
wanted to begin his retreat through Samnium to Apulia, a very mild,
sunny district, where he meant to take up his winter-quarters, and to
establish a communication with Tarentum and other towns of lower Italy,
and also with the king of Macedon. Here Fabius cut off his retreat near
Mount Callicula, blocking up with his troops the Caudine road, while
another body of Romans beset the passes of Casinum, which led to Rome.
Then Hannibal availed himself of his famous stratagem: he had encamped
near the mountains which Fabius occupied. Livy’s account of this
stratagem makes out rather a silly story for the Romans. He says that
Hannibal tied faggots to the horns of oxen, and setting these on fire,
had them driven up into the mountains between the Roman posts; and
that on this, the Romans, believing them to be spectres, had betaken
themselves to flight. But the real truth is what Polybius tells.
Nothing was more common among the ancients than to march by torch
light. Now, when the Romans saw lights between their stations in the
space which was left unoccupied, they thought that the Carthaginians
were breaking through; and they quickly made for what they supposed to
be the endangered spot, that they might stop their further progress.
In the meanwhile, the rest of the Carthaginians had advanced close
to the defiles, and had stormed the abandoned posts; and thus the
whole of the army got off without any loss: the Roman camp was burnt.
Hannibal encamped on the borders between Apulia and the country of the
Frentanians. Fabius followed him; and here the Master of the Horse,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account