Before turning to the next chapter, where I shall explain how he came to regard this step as inevitable, it should be said concerning Nietzsche's philosophy in general, that it is essentially and through and through religious and almost prophetic in spirit. No careful reader of his works can doubt that Nietzsche was a deeply religious man. A glance at _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ alone would convince any one of this; while in his constant references to religion throughout his works, as "a step to higher intellectuality,"[5] as "a means to invaluable contentedness,"[6] as "a measure of discipline,"[7] as a powerful social factor,[8] a more substantial confirmation of the fact is to be found. It is well to bear in mind, however, throughout our study of Nietzsche, that he had a higher type always in view; that he was also well aware that this type could only be attained by the strict observance of a new morality, and that if he opposed other forms of morality--more particularly the Christian form--it was because he earnestly believed that they were rearing an undesirable and even despicable kind of man. "Verily men have made for themselves all their good and evil. Verily they did not take it: they did not find it: it did not come down as a voice from heaven."[9] "Behold, the good and just! Whom do they hate most? Him who breaketh up their tables of values; the breaker, the law-breaker: he, however, is the creator."[10] "Verily a muddy stream is man. One must be at least a sea to be able to absorb a muddy stream without becoming unclean." "Behold, I teach you Superman: he is that sea; in him your great contempt can sink."[11] [1] See also D.D. Aph. 81. [2] Z., p. 67. [3] Z., p. 65. [4] Z., p. 138. [5] G. E., p. 81. [6] G. E., p. 81. [7] G. E., p. 80. [8] G. M., 3rd Essay, Aph. 15. [9] Z., p. 67. [10] Z., p. 20. [11] Z., p. 8. * * * * * Chapter III Nietzsche the Moralist Conceiving all forms of morality to be but weapons in the struggle for power, Nietzsche concluded that every species of man must at some time or other have taken to moralising, and must have called that "good" which its instincts approved, and that "bad" which its enemies instincts approved. In Beyond Good and Evil, however, he tells us that after making a careful examination "of the finer and coarser moralities which have hitherto prevailed or still prevail on earth," he found certain traits recurring so regularly together, and so closely connected with one another, that, finally, two primary types of morality revealed themselves to him. That is to say, after passing the known moralities of the world in review, he was able to classify them broadly into two types.