The maintenance of connection between the various portions of a force when engaged in night operations is a matter of supreme importance. The facility with which units go astray when connection is lost is extraordinary, and when once they have gone astray it is often very difficult to find them. I have myself seen a whole brigade of infantry disappear and be lost for nearly two hours in an area which hardly exceeded a square mile. _Rifle Fire in Night Attacks._ It cannot be too strongly impressed upon all ranks that to fire during a night attack is not only useless, but to use the words of General Dragomirov, is absolutely criminal. The Regulations lay down that rifles are not to be loaded, but the magazines are to be charged and the cut-offs closed, and this order must be rigidly adhered to. Personally, I am against having the magazines charged; the proper weapon for the infantry soldier to use at night is the bayonet, and he should be taught to rely on that alone. _Caution Necessary in Planning Night Operations, but Resolution Essential in their Execution._ Although it is necessary to act with caution, and to weigh well the chances of success and failure before deciding on an offensive night operation, yet, when once the undertaking has been commenced, it must be carried through with the utmost resolution. It is exceedingly unlikely that the enemy will be completely surprised, but every second of delay between the discovery of the attacking force and the delivery of the assault is of priceless value to the defence; it must, therefore, be impressed upon all ranks that when the enemy opens fire the only course open to them is to press on to the assault, and decide the issue with the bayonet. DEFENCE AGAINST NIGHT ATTACKS. _Passive Defence Useless._ Unless the defenders are protected by an impenetrable obstacle, a passive defence is suicidal. Artillery and machine guns may be laid so as to sweep a particular area at night, but no reliance can be placed on the effect of rifle fire unless the rifles have been mechanically fixed. I do not overlook the fact that instances are on record of huge losses inflicted by rifle fire at night, but I maintain that the effect obtained is merely a matter of chance, and any officer who puts his trust in chance is likely to have to pay dearly for his mistake. Every infantryman must be imbued with the idea that at night the bayonet is the only weapon which he can trust, and that the more promptly he uses it the better his chance of success will be. In the dark every advantage lies with the side that takes the initiative; numbers are of little account, for a resolute bayonet charge, delivered by even a single piquet may, if it comes unexpectedly, demoralise and throw into disorder a strong attacking column.