No Treason, Vol. VI.: The Constitution of No AuthoritySpooner, Lysander
Philosophy
No Treason, Vol. VI.: The Constitution of No Authority
Spooner, Lysander
Constitutional law -- United States
These money-lenders, the Rothschilds, for example, say to themselves: If
we lend a hundred millions sterling to the queen and parliament of
England, it will enable them to murder twenty, fifty, or a hundred
thousand people in England, Ireland, or India; and the terror inspired
by such wholesale murder, will enable them to keep the whole people of
those countries in subjection for twenty, or perhaps fifty, years to
come; to control all their trade and industry; and to extort from them
large amounts of money, under the name of taxes; and from the wealth
thus extorted from them, they (the queen and parliament) can afford to
pay us a higher rate of interest for our money than we can get in any
other way. Or, if we lend this sum to the emperor of Austria, it will
enable him to murder so many of his people as to strike terror into the
rest, and thus enable him to keep them in subjection, and extort money
from them, for twenty or fifty years to come. And they say the same in
regard to the emperor of Russia, the king of Prussia, the emperor of
France, or any other ruler, so called, who, in their judgment, will be
able, by murdering a reasonable portion of his people, to keep the rest
in subjection, and extort money from them, for a long time to come, to
pay the interest and principal of the money lent him.
And why are these men so ready to lend money for murdering their fellow
men? Solely for this reason, viz., that such loans are considered better
investments than loans for purposes of honest industry. They pay higher
rates of interest; and it is less trouble to look after them. This is
the whole matter.
The question of making these loans is, with these lenders, a mere
question of pecuniary profit. They lend money to be expended in robbing,
enslaving, and murdering their fellow men, solely because, on the whole,
such loans pay better than any others. They are no respecters of
persons, no superstitious fools, that reverence monarchs. They care no
more for a king, or an emperor, than they do for a beggar, except as he
is a better customer, and can pay them better interest for their money.
If they doubt his ability to make his murders successful for maintaining
his power, and thus extorting money from his people in future, they
dismiss him as unceremoniously as they would dismiss any other hopeless
bankrupt, who should want to borrow money to save himself from open
insolvency.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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