I deny both these inferences, and I ask the reader to hear my case patiently, and to judge it on its merits. Let us first test the justice of our laws, divine and human: the question of their usefulness we will deal with later. CHAPTER ONE--THE LAWS OF GOD DIVINE law says that certain acts are good, and that certain acts are evil; and that God will reward those who do well, and will punish those who do ill. And we are told that God will so act because God is _just_. But I claim that God _cannot_ justly punish those, who disobey, nor reward those who obey His laws. Religious people tell us that God is "The Great First Cause": that God created _all_ things--mankind, the universe, nature and all her laws. Who is answerable for a thing that is caused: he who causes it, or he who does not cause it? He who causes it is answerable. And God is "The First Great Cause" of _all_ things. And the cause of all things is answerable for all things. If God created _all_ things He must have created the evil as well as the good. Who, then, is responsible for good and evil? Only God, for He made them. He who creates all is responsible for all. God created all: God is responsible for all. He who creates nothing is responsible for nothing. Man created nothing: man is responsible for nothing. Therefore man is not responsible for his nature, nor for the acts prompted by that nature. Therefore God cannot justly punish man for his acts. Therefore the Divine law, with its code of rewards and punishments, is not a just law, and cannot have emanated from a just God. Therefore the Christian religion is built upon a foundation of error, and there are no such things as God's wrath, God's pardon; heaven or hell. That argument has never been answered. But attempts have been made to evade it, and the plea most commonly put forward has been so gracefully expressed by Mr. G. K. Chesterton that I will quote it in his own words: Now, the question round which this controversy has circled for ages is simply this: Clearly God can, in the exercise of His omnipotence, give part of Himself to His creatures; can give His strength to the bull, or His beauty to the lily. Could God possibly, in the exercise of His omnipotence, give to one of His creatures some portion of that other quality of His--His originating power, His power of primal invention, this making things from nothing or Himself? If God can do all things, can He not make man free? Can He not give man the power to create actions as God creates stars? He can give His force; can He give a little of his sovereignty? Can He, in short, create a kind of little God--an "imago Dei?" The answer to that quaint piece of reasoning is that it begs the question. For I do not say that God cannot give to man any power He chooses; but that God is responsible, and man is not responsible, for the nature and the acts of any power by God bestowed.