The will is as free in one nation and in one class as in another. Who would more willingly return a blow, an Irish soldier, or an English Quaker? Who would be readier to stab a rival, an English curate, or a Spanish smuggler? The difference does not concern the freedom of the will: it is a difference of heredity and environment. The wills of a priest and a sailor are free--free to make love in every port, and to swear in every breeze. The difference is one of environment. The free will party look upon a criminal as a bad man, who could be good if he wished: _but he cannot wish_. The free will party say that if Smith wills to drink he is bad. But we say that Smith drinks, and to drink is bad; but Smith drinks because he is Smith. The free will party say, "then he was born bad." But we say "no: he was born Smith." We all know that we can foretell the action of certain men in certain cases, because we know the men. We know that under the same conditions Jack Sheppard would steal and Cardinal Manning would not steal. We know that under the same conditions the sailor would flirt with the waitress, and the priest would not; that the drunkard would get drunk, and the abstainer would remain sober. We know that Wellington would refuse a bribe, that Nelson would not run away, that Buonaparte would grasp at power, that Abraham Lincoln would be loyal to his country, that Torquemada would not spare a heretic. Why? If the will is free, how can we be sure, before a test arises, how the will must act? Simply because we know that heredity and environment have so formed and moulded men and women that under certain circumstances the action of their wills is certain. Heredity and environment having made a man a thief, he will steal. Heredity and environment having made a man honest, he will not steal. That is to say, heredity and environment have decided the action of the will, before the time has come for the will to act. This being so--and we all know that it is so--what becomes of the sovereignty of the will? Let any man that believes that he can "do as he likes" ask himself _why_ he _likes_, and he will see the error of the theory of free will, and will understand why the will is the servant and not the master of the man: for the man is the product of heredity and environment, and these control the will. As we want to get this subject as clear as we can, let us take one or two familiar examples of the action of the will. Jones and Robinson meet and have a glass of whisky. Jones asks Robinson to have another. Robinson says, "no thank you, one is enough." Jones says, "all right: have another cigarette." Robinson takes the cigarette. Now, here we have a case where a man refuses a second drink, but takes a second smoke. Is it because he would like another cigarette, but would not like another glass of whisky? No. It is because he knows that it is _safer_ not to take another glass of whisky.