Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciencesWhewell, William
Philosophy
Novum organon renovatum: Being the second part of the philosophy of the inductive sciences
Whewell, William
Science -- Philosophy
9. Although, as we have said, we can give few precise directions for
this cardinal process, the Selection of the Idea, in speculating on
phenomena, yet there is one Rule which may have its use: it is
this:--_The idea and the facts must be homogeneous_: the elementary
Conceptions, into which the facts have been decomposed, must be of
the same nature as the Idea by which we attempt to collect them into
laws. Thus, if facts have been observed and measured by reference to
space, they must be bound together by the idea of space: if we would
obtain a knowledge of mechanical forces in the solar system, we must
observe mechanical phenomena. Kepler erred against this rule in his
attempts at obtaining physical laws of the system; for the facts
which he took were the _velocities_, not the _changes of velocity_,
which are really the mechanical facts. Again, there has been a
transgression of this Rule committed by all chemical philosophers
who have attempted to assign the relative position of the elementary
particles of bodies in their component molecules. For their purpose
has been to discover the _relations_ of the particles in _space_;
and yet they have neglected the only facts in the constitution of
bodies which have a reference to space--namely, _crystalline form_,
and _optical properties_. No progress can be made in the theory of
the elementary structure of bodies, {194} without making these
classes of facts the main basis of our speculations.
10. The only other Rule which I have to offer on this subject, is
that which I have already given:--_the Idea must be tested by the
facts_. It must be tried by applying to the facts the conceptions
which are derived from the idea, and not accepted till some of these
succeed in giving the law of the phenomena. The justice of the
suggestion cannot be known otherwise than by making the trial. If we
can discover a _true law_ by employing any conceptions, the idea
from which these conceptions are derived is the _right_ one; nor can
there be any proof of its rightness so complete and satisfactory, as
that we are by it led to a solid and permanent truth.
This, however, can hardly be termed a Rule; for when we would know,
to conjecture and to try the truth of our conjecture by a comparison
with the facts, is the natural and obvious dictate of common sense.
Supposing the Idea which we adopt, or which we would try, to be now
fixed upon, we still have before us the range of many Conceptions
derived from it; many Formulæ may be devised depending on the same
Independent Variable, and we must now consider how our selection
among these is to be made.
{{195}}
CHAPTER VI.
GENERAL RULES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONCEPTION.
APHORISM XXXVIII.
_The Construction of the Conception very often includes, in a great
measure, the Determination of the Magnitudes._
APHORISM XXXIX.
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