If you had said that no revelation can be the suggestion of infinite wisdom, if contrary to right reason, it would have been intelligible and true: but if the divine light really discovers any thing to us, we want no test to confirm it. Again you say, that reason, if kept under the regulating influence of the divine law, will know everything that rises up at first sight; but that as free agents, we can reason ourselves into a belief that wrong is right. Now what kind of reason can this be? It does seem that reason is given to us because we are free agents, and that it would be a very useless gift were it otherwise: and we do know that this faculty is improved by observation and experience, and that so far from its enabling us to know every thing at first sight, it is by study and meditation that our knowledge is extended, and that at last, we know but little. But the reason of which you speak, is a reason that arrives at all knowledge without deduction, and can act and determine with unerring certainty, although contrary to that reason which is given to us as free agents. It must follow, that the faculty which you call reason, is an instinct never before known to exist; or that all this circumlocution ends in the production of one of those phantasms which are sometimes engendered by the imagination, and which has persuaded you that two inspirations are necessary to confirm our belief, that they are distinct in their nature, and that one of them is right reason. When the sensations occasioned by the sonorous voice in which the pompous terms _analogy of reason, rational souls, and recipients for truth_ are delivered, have passed away; and we seriously meditate the manner in which they are applied; low indeed must that man be in the scale of intellectual being, who does not discover that all "is but as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal." LETTER IV.