Old Europe's Suicide; or, The Building of a Pyramid of Errors: An Account of Certain Events in Europe During the Period 1912–1919Thomson, Christopher Birdwood, Baron
History
Old Europe's Suicide; or, The Building of a Pyramid of Errors: An Account of Certain Events in Europe During the Period 1912–1919
Thomson, Christopher Birdwood, Baron
Balkan Peninsula -- History -- War of 1912-1913; Eastern question (Balkan); World War, 1914-1918
It would be a rash statement to say that a European conflagration was
the inevitable outcome of a little Balkan War, but metaphor will not
be strained by comparing that same little war to a spark in close
proximity to a heap of combustible material, a spark fanned in secret
by ambitious and unscrupulous men, while others stood by, and, either
from ignorance or indifference, did nothing to prevent an inevitable
and incalculable disaster. That, as the present writer sees it, is the
parable of the Balkan Wars. And so in the first part of this book,
which deals with the period 1912-1914, the selfish intrigues of the
Central Empires are contrasted with the equally vicious proceedings
of the Imperial Russian Government, with the ignorance and inertia
which characterized Great Britain’s Continental policy and with the
vacillations of the Latin States. In later chapters, comments are made
on the diplomatic negotiations with the neutral Balkan States in 1915
and 1916, on the conduct of the war and on the Treaty signed June 28,
1919, in the Palace at Versailles.
The title refers to the downfall of the Central Empires, which were the
last strongholds of the aristocratic traditions of Old Europe, both
from a social and a political point of view. It is submitted that these
Empires perished prematurely through the suicidal folly of their ruling
classes. Under wiser statesmanship, their autocratic governmental
system might have survived another century. Germany and Austria-Hungary
were prosperous States, and were assured of still greater prosperity if
events had pursued their normal course. But pride, ambition, impatience
and an overweening confidence in efficiency without idealism destroyed
their plans. They put their faith in Force, mere brutal Force, and
hoped to achieve more rapidly by conquest a commercial and political
predominance which, by waiting a few years, they could have acquired
without bloodshed. In the end, the military weapon they had forged
became the instrument of their own destruction. Too much was demanded
from the warlike German tribes; an industrial age had made war an
affair of workshops, and against them were arrayed all the resources of
Great Britain and America. Blind to these patent facts, a few reckless
militarists who held the reins of power goaded a docile people on to
desperate and unavailing efforts, long after all hope of victory had
vanished, and thus committed suicide as a despairing warrior does who
falls upon his sword.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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