He may, however, be readily reassured, if one will point out to him the error in his argument. The whole argument began by assuming that he has evidence that some object is in front of his body and in front of the body of another man; that he has a body and so has the other man. If this knowledge be immediate, of course it may furnish the basis of an argument; but if it be not immediate, one has no right to begin with it, but should go back to what is immediate. Let us assume that it is immediate. What I am then conscious of is my own body, the other man's body and the object in relation to them. Upon this basis I argue to some representative of the object I immediately see, and I connect it with the man's brain. Does the man now see two objects or only one? If only one, which one? The one I refer to his brain, or the one I see? Does the one he sees seem to him to be in his brain? Probably he has not the least notion that it is connected with that organ. Am I, then, in his case? Do I also see only a copy of the object in my brain? And may this not be true, although I have no immediate knowledge of my brain and its relation to that object? But--and this is the important point--if all this be true, how about the position with which I started? My argument is based upon two real bodies and a real object. I see that I was wholly in error in supposing that I saw these and could reason from them. Then the reasoning is not good. Then the conclusion is not reliable, and it is not proved that I see immediately only an image in, or in some sort of contact with, my brain. The fallacious character of the argument is plain enough; where is the flaw? It lies in this: