But in which ever of the ways mentioned a man thinks of "real" things, he does what I have described. And when he implies that the immediately known and the "real" are in some sense the same, as he does when he talks as if there were but the one object, or asserts that we do not know things as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us; he really uses the word same in the fifth sense that I have given. The fact that he is using it to indicate the relation between percepts and a certain class of ideas which he has come to regard as duplicates of his percepts does not make the use of the word a new one. Whatever may be the state of affairs outside of his consciousness, this is all that takes place within it; and the word same, used in this connection, can mean no more to him than I have said. SEC. 9. To avoid needless prolixity I will class together and very briefly treat of the kinds of sameness which one may attribute to "external" things. It is not necessary to go at length into the discussion of these, for since the "external" world, as it is assumed by those who have faith in it, is, to the man thinking it, simply a more or less modified duplicate of the world of things immediately perceived; and since all ground for attributing to it any determinations at all must be found in that which is immediately perceived; we may naturally look to find in it nothing that we have not already found in this immediate world. How, indeed, could anything else get into it? We cannot have _in_ mind what is by hypothesis _out_ of mind. The "real" world is then, in the mind of the man who thinks it, a world of imagined objects, and the world of imagination depends for its material upon the world of sense. A little reflection will show that the kinds of sameness of these "realities" are only the kinds of sameness already discussed duplicated, and assumed to belong to a new world. 1. An "external" quality or group of qualities may be said to be the _same_ with itself at any one instant. Here we have Sense I carried over into the field of imagined duplicates. 2. An "external" quality existing at one time may be said to be the _same_ with an "external" quality existing at another time, to indicate that the two are similar. The same thing may be true of any group of qualities. Here we have Sense II. 3. The "external" bundle of qualities, which formed for Locke the knowable element in a thing or "body," may be regarded as being the _same_ at two different times--as having, so to speak, a life-history. Here one is simply calling up in thought the experience described under Sense III. 4. Two "external" things (bundles of "real" qualities), or two "external" qualities, existing at one time, may be called the _same_ to mark similarity. Here we have Sense IV.