On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge — John Shaqi
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of KnowledgeFullerton, George Stuart
Philosophy
On Sameness and Identity: A Psychological Study: Being a Contribution to the Foundations of a Theory of Knowledge
Fullerton, George Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of
SEC. 10. When we come to the question of the sameness of the Self or
Ego we are, if possible, on more debatable ground than heretofore.
The whole subject of our knowledge of the Self lies as yet, in the
opinion of many, very much in the dark. Without undertaking the task of
defining narrowly what this elusive something is, it would seem that I
may safely make concerning it at least the following assertions:
In using the word self, we may have reference either to what is
immediately known as appearing in the circle of consciousness, the
phenomenon, or to a something supposed to lie beyond this sphere and to
be known only through its representative in consciousness.
Now this something beyond may be looked at in various ways. John
Locke, in discussing the not-self, made the three-fold division of
idea, bundle of "real" qualities, and substance. He might with equal
reason have distinguished in a similar way between the self as idea
(the immediately known), the self as a bundle of "real" qualities (not
immediately known), and the self as substance. As a matter of fact,
however, he did not put the not-self and the self upon the same plane.
He seemed to think that we know the self more immediately, and to hold
that it enters consciousness as the bundle of "real" qualities[24]
which, in the case of matter, is assumed to lie beyond. The "substance"
of the self, however, he condemns to outer darkness and the company
of material substance. To me there seems no reason, admitting the
right to pass at all beyond the immediately perceived, for making
the distinction which he does make. And as one, who has followed him
with assent in his treatment of the not-self, may, with some justice
complain of his inconsistency and refuse to follow him here, I mention
the position he might have taken as well as the position he actually
did take with respect to the self and its existences.
[24] Compare Bk. 4, Ch. 9, § 3 of the "Essay," with Bk. 4, Ch. 11,
§§ 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9.
SEC. 11. The word self may then be regarded as referring either:
1. To the self as phenomenon, a something immediately perceived, a part
or the whole of our conscious experience;
2. To a complex of "real" qualities beyond and represented by the self
as it appears in consciousness;
3. To the substance of self, or self as noumenon, a vague and
ill-defined something, supposed to be distinct from and to underlie
phenomena or "real" qualities; or
4. To two, or to all, of these taken together.
If the word is used in the last of these senses any inquiry concerning
sameness must split up its complex meaning and treat separately the
different elements included. It remains, then, to inquire what kinds of
sameness we may attribute to the self in the first three senses given.
I will take them in reverse order.
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