Why, because motion is either motion in place or change in self; these are the only kinds of motion. Yes. And the one, when changed in itself, cannot possibly be any longer one. It cannot. And therefore cannot experience this sort of motion? Clearly not. Can the motion of one, then, be in place? Perhaps. But if one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another? Certainly. And that which moves round and round in the same place, must go round upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have other parts which move around the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre? Impossible. But perhaps the motion of the one consists in going from one place to another? Perhaps so, if it moves at all. And have we not already shown that one can not be in anything? Yes. And still greater is the impossibility of one coming into being in anything? I do not see how that is. Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, cannot as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor remain entirely out of it, if already coming into being in it. Certainly. And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and the one part may be in that other, and the other part out of it; but that which has no parts cannot possibly be at the same time a whole, which is either within or without anything. True. And how can that which has neither parts, nor a whole, come into being anywhere either as a part or a whole? Is not that a still greater impossibility? Clearly. Then one does not change by a change of place, whether by going somewhere and coming into being in something; or again, by going round in the same place; or again, by change in itself? True. The one, then, is incapable of any kind of motion? Incapable. But neither can the one exist in anything, as we affirm? Yes, that is affirmed by us. Then it is never in the same? Why not? Because being in the same is being in something which is the same. Certainly. But it cannot be in itself, and cannot be in other? True. Then one is never the same?[35] [35] The text of Stallbaum (1848) does not harmonize with this. The version I quote leaves out ἐν, and reads τὸ αὐτό in the nominative. It would seem not. And that which is never in the same has no rest, and stands not still? It cannot stand still. One, then, as would seem, is neither standing still nor in motion? Clearly not. Neither will one be the same with itself or other; nor again, other than itself, or other. How is that? If other than itself it would be other than one, and would not be one. True. And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition, too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one? It would. Then it will not be the same with other, or other than itself? It will not.