Neither will one be other than other, while it remains one; for not the one, but only the other, can be other of other, and nothing else. True. Then not by virtue of being one, will one be other? Certainly not. But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of being itself; and if not by virtue of being itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other of anything? Right. Neither will one be the same with itself. Why not? Because the nature of the one is surely not the nature of the same. Why is that? Because when a thing becomes the same with anything, it does not necessarily become one. Why not? That which becomes the same with the many necessarily becomes many and not one. True. And yet, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same. Certainly. And, therefore, if one be the same with one, it is not one with one, and will therefore be one and also not one. But that is surely impossible. And therefore the one can neither be other of other, nor the same with one. Impossible. And thus one is neither the same, nor other, in relation to itself or other? No. Neither will one be like or unlike itself or other. Why not? Because likeness is sameness of affections. Yes. And sameness has been shown to be a nature distinct from oneness? That has been shown. But if one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; and that is impossible. True. Then one can never have the same affections either as another or as itself? Clearly not. Then it cannot be like other, or like itself. No. Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one. It would. That which is affected in a manner other than itself or other, will be unlike itself or other, if sameness of affections is likeness. True. But the one, as appears, never having affections other than its own, is never unlike itself or other? Never. Then the one is never either like or unlike itself or other? Plainly not. In reading this extract one cannot but admire the courtesy or wonder at the simplicity of Aristoteles. He always answers just as he should to keep the ball rolling; and he is in no wise compelled to do this under the circumstances, for the argument is loose in the extreme. Briefly stated, the reasoning is as follows: