We have here one chief error, which runs through almost the whole of the argument--is, indeed, the "Kern" of the "Pudel"--and several subsidiary errors of different kinds. Some of these last are very readily discovered, as that about the coming into being in a thing. With these, however, I am not concerned. I merely remark _en passant_ that they may all be cleared up with a little care and accuracy, and I turn to the main error, which consists in a constant confusion of two kinds of sameness. The fact is that Parmenides is always passing from "the one," or one in the abstract, mere oneness, to "a one," or one object. These are no more identical in the strict sense than "manhood" and "a man," and in overlooking their difference he is simply confounding the first and the fourth kinds of sameness. "The one" cannot have parts, for the good reason that it is a quality taken by itself, and not a thing, which is thought as a bundle of qualities. "A one," on the other hand, may have parts, and each of these parts may be "a one" too. "A one" by no means consists of a single element, oneness, but of this element combined with others; and each such group may be distinguished from each other such group, and all be recognized as similar, or the same in a true sense of the word. The question whether one can be in a place, too, evidently has to do, not with "the one," but "a one," for spacial or temporal differences are individualizing, and distinguish a thing from another thing of the same kind. To ask whether "the one" may or may not be in a place is inadmissible. The same error is at the bottom of the argument about the one's being in motion or at rest. The question has no significance except in reference to "a one." If we speak of "the one" as in motion, we at once put this abstract element in such a relation to other elements that we have no longer "the one" but "a one." "The one" cannot have change in itself and remain "the one," but "a one" may change a good deal and still be "a one." And without admitting the justice of the argument, that what has no parts cannot be in anything, the proof of the impossibility of motion in space may be condemned merely upon the ground that it is only "the one" which cannot have parts, while it is only "a one" which is concerned in the problem of motion. The same may be said for the argument against the one's coming into being in anything. It is only "a one" which can be thought as coming into being in a thing, and "a one" may have parts. As for the impossibility of the one's being at rest, on the ground that to be at rest, a thing must be in the same, and one cannot be in anything--this is a repetition of the former error. "A one" may be in something, as has been pointed out, even on the basis established at the outset, and it is with this, and not with "the one," that we are concerned in the problem of rest and motion.